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“The image is one thing and the human being is another. It’s very hard 
to live up to an image, put it that way.”  
– Elvis Presley1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Life imitates art and art imitates life.2  But when art usurps from life, 
the rights of the individual whose life story has been appropriated become 
murky.  And when life utilizes the representation of characters that have 
become famous in art, rights for the actors who have brought these 
characters to life are additionally unclear. 
One such solution is to create a codified right of publicity in these 
two circumstances, thus granting individuals a proprietary right in their 
own life stories as well as permitting actors to control the use of the 
personas that they have cultivated on screen. 
The concept of the right of publicity has existed within the scope of 
intellectual property law for over half of a century.3  In Haelan 
Laboratories Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,4 the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals created a complement to the pre-existing statutory right to 
privacy.5  The court explained that “it is common knowledge that many 
prominent persons . . . far from having their feelings bruised through 
public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no 
longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their 
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and 
subways.”6 
Today, the right is recognized through various state statutes and 
common law, and involves the appropriation of a persona’s name, 
likeness, or picture without consent—a violation of the commercial tort 
of unfair competition.7  In a society that is saturated with stars, obsessed 
with fame, and in constant reverence of celebrity, the judiciary is ripe 
with litigations involving alleged misuse of a celebrity persona. And 
perpetually growing technological and social platforms that allow for 
instantaneous sharing populate society with the means by which to 
 
 1  Elvis Presley, Quotable Quote, GOODREADS, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/2153 
63-the-image-is-one-thing-and-the-human-being-is. 
 2  OSCAR WILDE, The Decay of Lying—An Observation, in INTENTIONS (1891) (“Life 
imitates Art far more than Art imitates Life.”). 
 3  See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 4  Id. 
 5  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193 (1890) (“[T]he right to life has come to mean . . . the right to be let alone.”). 
 6  Haelan Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d at 868. 
 7  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
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accelerate these misappropriations. 
However, current statutes decline to extend the right of publicity in 
two different contexts: an actor’s rights to the characters that he or she 
brings to life or one’s rights in his or her own life story.  The right of 
publicity is a dually economic and moral right: it both prevents unjust 
enrichment in the commercial sphere and also allows for someone who is 
well-known to own and control the portrayal and usage of his or her own 
identity and persona.8  Therefore, limiting publicity rights solely to 
traditional commercial contexts—advertisements that imply false 
endorsements—neglects to account for the fact that the right is a moral 
one as well.9  And as a moral right, it grants its holder with the capacity 
to use or refrain from using it without restrictions or usurpation of 
ownership.10  Celebrities can copyright the books that they write or 
trademark their catchphrases, but cannot universally gain rights of 
publicity over their identities that they have cultivated, which naturally 
includes the characters that they have created and the story of their life.  
The purpose of copyright is to provide an economic incentive for 
creators.11  The purpose of trademark is to prevent unfair competition or 
dilution.12  Should there not be a parallel for celebrity publicity? 
This Note will argue for the inclusion of life story and fictional 
character portrayal rights in right of publicity legislation, while also 
balancing the various conflicting interests.  On the one hand, there is the 
argument for rewarding sweat equity, allowing ownership in one’s own 
story or work product, and preventing unjust enrichment, and on the other 
hand, there is the public’s right to access information and affording 
artistic license and creativity.  Part II will set out the background on the 
current state of right of publicity law, including several seminal cases that 
have shaped the common law interpretation of the right and what areas 
of celebrity persona are currently protected.  Part III analyzes the need 
for this new addendum to this evolving area of intellectual property law, 
and how the various competing interests between rights holders and the 
public would be balanced.  Part IV argues for the need for a descendible 
right of publicity through the creation of future interests that would 
 
 8  Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE 
L. J. 383, 404 (1999) (“In fact, many jurisdictions acknowledge that even celebrities who have 
commodified their images may object to the unauthorized use of their images on moral (i.e., 
personal autonomy) as well as economic grounds.”). 
 9  Natural Right, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER L. DICTIONARY DESK EDITION (2012).  
 10  Id. 
 11  See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges 
of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (1989). 
 12  See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840 (2007). 
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ensure continued post-mortem protection over one’s persona and life 
story.  Part V concludes. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
There are judicial strains on district and circuit courts stemming 
from the lack of a uniform codification of right of publicity legislation.13  
Each state that does have a statute that addresses right of publicity has 
adopted distinctive rules and interprets them in a unique manner.14 
The Supreme Court has only heard a right of publicity case on one 
occasion. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,15 a television 
station covertly recorded and broadcast Hugo Zacchini’s “human 
cannonball” performance without obtaining his consent or providing him 
with any form of compensation.  The Court reasoned that there was “not 
the appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to enhance the 
attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very 
activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first 
place.”16  Justice White, writing for the majority, posited that the news 
company appropriated Zacchini’s performance, thereby contravening his 
future ability to make a living—a fundamental right protected by the 
Constitution.17  Since the Court found that Scripps-Howard’s usage of the 
clip was not a situation in which speech could be chilled—as the public 
would not be “deprived of the benefit of [Zacchini’s] performance as long 
as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized”—the First 
Amendment protections were not applicable.18  Additionally, Zacchini 
did not seek to enjoin his performance from airing, but instead felt that 
he should be compensated for its broadcast.19 
A celebrity’s identity can be valuable in the promotion of products, 
and the commercial exploitation of that identity is analogous to an 
invasion of his or her rights regardless of whether a name or likeness is 
used.20  In Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 21 the Sixth 
Circuit held that the use of the phrase “Here’s Johnny” was impermissible 
and inappropriate, since it was objectively connected to “The Tonight 
 
 13  See generally Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal 
Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 227, 227 (1999). 
 14  Id. 
 15  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 562 (1977). 
 16  Id. at 576 (citing Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law–Were Warren and Brandeis 
Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 331 (1966)). 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. at 578. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 21  Id. at 837. 
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Show” host Johnny Carson.  There should not be any difference between 
if the appropriated identity is that of the celebrity’s face, personal or 
professional name, voice, or character that he or she has become 
intrinsically affiliated with or the story of his or her life.22  It is not 
important how the plaintiff’s identity has been appropriated, only that it 
has been appropriated, since celebrities should have the sole right to 
exploit their identity value for profit.23 
Currently, twenty-two states recognize the statutory right of 
publicity, and carve out protections for various appropriations including 
name, likeness, image, and voice, and thirty-eight states have common 
law precedent-based rights of publicity.24  However, no statutory 
publicity rights exist to defend life stories or fictional character 
portrayals. 
The right of publicity is not immune to controversy.25  In Zacchini, 
Justice White defended the enforcement of the right of publicity by 
explaining that its rationale is the “straight-forward one of preventing 
unjust enrichment by the theft of good will.”26  He went on to explain that 
“[n]o social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some 
aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he 
would normally pay.”27  Copyright scholar Melville B. Nimmer 
published an Article one year after the pivotal Haelan decision, in which 
he expounded on the concept that “publicity value” is acquired through 
the expenditure of “considerable time, effort, skill, and even money,” so 
therefore, “every person is entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there 
are important countervailing public policy considerations.”28 
However, others have argued that the right has “spun out of control” 
in its application by courts “hand[ing] celebrities a new property right 
 
 22  See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a 
celebrity’s distinctive and recognizable voice is as much a part of her “likeness”). 
 23  White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding 
appropriation through impersonation in Samsung’s use of a robot dressed as Vanna White and 
posed in front of a “Wheel of Fortune” game without her consent in one of its advertisements). 
 24  Jonathan Faber, Statutes & Interactive Map, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://rightof 
publicity.com/statutes (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
 25  Linda J. Stack, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.’s Expansion of the Right 
of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U.L. REV. 1189, 
1189 (1995) (proposing a judicial approach that would prevent overextending the right of 
publicity in the future). 
 26  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (citing Harry 
Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 326, 331 (1966)). 
 27  Id.  
 28  Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 
(1954). 
BEACH 2017 
136 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 42:1 
with greatly expanded boundaries.”29  Many feel that celebrities can turn 
to traditional modes of intellectual property—copyright and trademark—
to ensure protection, yet these mechanisms fail to adequately address 
otherwise non-protectable identities. 
The Lanham Act, the federal statute governing trademarks, service 
marks, and unfair competition, finds civilly liable any person who uses 
“any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” 
that is “likely to cause confusion . . . or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to 
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities.”30  While many plaintiffs have included claims of 
infringement under the Lanham Act along with right of publicity 
violations, the trademark act is primarily focused on commerce and 
trade.31  This includes unfair competition, trademark dilution, and false 
designation of origin, but does not focus on artistic or creative forms of 
expression and, therefore, the Act does not adequately protect a publicity 
appropriation.32  Nimmer argues that under the current intellectual 
property law framework, “publicity values are not effectively protected” 
since “a person’s publicity values may be profitably exploited in non-
competitive fields.”33  He has reservations about the potential success that 
a plaintiff may find in litigating an appropriation case against a company 
or brand that is not in direct competition with the plaintiff.34 
Statutorily, and through common law, there is a large gap in how the 
law protects personas and identities of both well-known and non-famous 
people.  Because there is a lack of uniformity, different courts do not 
possess an adequate roadmap of what rules to apply when answering 
questions pertaining to the right of publicity.  This results in a vast 
imbalance of justice to potential publicity rights holders who may 
succeed on a claim of misuse of one aspect of his or her identity but not 
on another valid aspect that is equally deserving of protection.  Part III 
will make an argument for amending right of publicity legislation to 
include both life story rights and rights in fictional character portrayals in 
audiovisual media, and will explain why such legislation is most 
equitable to the rights holders while still allowing the advancement of 
creativity without imposing a ban on freedom of expression under the 
 
 29  Arlen W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity “Wheel” Spun 
Out of Control, 45 KAN. L. REV. 329, 330 (1997). 
 30  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2017). 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Nimmer, supra note 28, at 210. 
 34  Nimmer, supra note 28, at 216. 
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First Amendment. 
III. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN THE REAL AND MAKE-BELIEVE 
A. Life Stories are Inseparable from Persona 
It has often been said that “[t]ruth is stranger than fiction.”35  So it is 
no surprise that moviemakers, television writers, novel authors, and 
theatrical producers alike have made millions of dollars in the 
entertainment industry by telling stories that have already been lived.36  
Therefore it is only natural that life story rights be added into right of 
publicity statutes, as one’s life story is as intrinsically connected to one’s 
persona as his or her likeness and name, and therefore should be granted 
the same amount of protections. 
In balancing the various competing interests to certify a legislation 
expansion that would not be too restrictive or would not be preempted by 
the First Amendment, there must be narrow constraints that a potential 
plaintiff’s claim must fall within in order for it to pass constitutional 
muster.  A heightened evidentiary showing requirement would allow for 
defendants to continue creatively expressing themselves and introducing 
new artistic works into the marketplace.  In such a case, a plaintiff could 
only succeed if he or she could show that there are distinct and remarkable 
connections between the circumstances and characterization presented in 
the work of fiction or unauthorized biography and the plaintiff’s own life, 
and that these links would be indistinguishable to a viewer, in the same 
vein as an unfair competition or false advertising claim would be to a 
consumer. 
Additionally, defendants may utilize “anti-SLAPP” legislation to 
prevent chilling freedom of speech or expression by attempting to dismiss 
cases that are violative of issues of actual “public importance.”37  A 
strategic lawsuit against public participation (“SLAPP”) is a lawsuit that 
a plaintiff brings about to deliberately stifle or silence a defendant by 
forcing a defendant to develop a legal defense if he or she refuses to 
comply with a censor.38  Anti-SLAPP statutes claim that these suits 
 
 35  MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR: A JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD 140 
(1897). 
 36  See, e.g., Anjelica Oswald, ‘Hamilton’ Tickets Sell For More Than $2,000—Here’s 
How Much Money Broadway’s Hottest Musical Is Raking In, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2016, 
10:56 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/hamilton-musical-revenue-facts-2016-4/#create 
d-and-composed-by-lin-manuel-miranda-the-musical-is-based-on-hamilton-a-biography-abo 
ut-alexander-hamilton-written-by-ron-chernow-1 (detailing how the hit musical Hamilton, 
based upon the life story of America’s Founding Father, makes over $1.5 million each week). 
 37  SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 38  What Is a SLAPP?, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/what-is-a-
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encumber freedom of speech and create a chilling effect, and thus such 
suits are illegal in many jurisdictions.39  In 2015, the House introduced a 
bipartisan bill entitled “SPEAK FREE Act of 2015,” which was intended 
to formulate a federal anti-SLAPP ability to dismiss claims that “arise 
from an oral or written statement or other expression, or conduct in 
furtherance of such expression, by the defendant in connection with an 
official proceeding or about a matter of public concern.”40  “Public 
concern” includes an issue related to a “public official or public figure” 
or a “good, product, or service in the marketplace.”41  This legislation 
complicates the conundrum of whether or not right of publicity claims 
would be, in effect, shut out by any future defendants who would bring 
about an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss by claiming that the plaintiff is 
chilling its freedom of speech and expression.42 
i. Why the Right to Privacy Is Not Applicable 
Several courts have considered the degree of ownership that one has 
over his or her own life story that is being portrayed on screen or in 
literature.  These courts have struggled with how to recognize a legal right 
in these circumstances and under what legal theories they should be 
acknowledged.  While the right to privacy has been applied in some cases, 
this does not serve an adequate or relevant purpose.  Privacy is about 
protection from publicity, not the ability to generate one’s own 
publicity.43  In cases involving life stories, the individuals claiming 
misappropriation are seeking to dictate the use of their own personas and 
selecting who may or may not profit from creating fictional or fact-based 
expressive works centered around their identities. 
 
slapp/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
 39  Id. 
 40  H.R. 2304. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Actress Olivia de Havilland brought a suit against television network FX and “Feud” 
showrunner Ryan Murphy for infringing upon her publicity rights by inaccurately depicting 
her in the series “Feud: Bette and Joan.”  Libby Hill, Olivia de Havilland Scores Court 
Victory; Trial Will Begin Nov. 27, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017, 12:54 PM), http://www.latimes 
.com/entertainment/la-et-entertainment-news-updates-olivia-de-havilland-scores-court15067 
10393-htmlstory.html.  FX and Murphy retaliated with a motion to strike, claiming that under 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute, the work is protected as “a social commentary on 
Hollywood’s history of sexism, misogyny, and media manipulation, issues that still plague 
Hollywood today.”  Nardine Saad, Olivia de Havilland, at 101, Gears Up For a Fight in 
‘Feud’ Court Battle, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017, 1:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/entertain 
ment/tv/la-et-st-olivia-de-havilland-feud-fx-lawsuit-20170830-story.html.  The court found 
that while the defendants’ speech was protected under the statute, there was demonstrable 
evidence that the plaintiff could prevail at trial, thus denying the anti-SLAPP motion, in a 
major victory for publicity rights holders.  See Hill, supra. 
 43  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5, at 215. 
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The right to privacy is “the claim that a man has the right to pass 
through this world, if he wills, without having his picture published . . . 
or his eccentricities commented upon either in handbills, circulars, 
catalogues, periodicals or newspapers.”44  In his article Privacy, William 
Prosser sets forth four categories of invasion that are recognized in 
privacy law: (1) intrusion of seclusion or solitude; (2) public disclosure 
of private facts; (3) false light; and (4) appropriation.45  The right to 
privacy is intended to protect an individual’s mental or emotional well-
being.46  But as for the final element, appropriation, Prosser explains that 
this interest is “not so much a mental as a proprietary one.”47  The right 
to one’s own publicity is more than mental or emotional well-being or 
reputational—it is also economic.  This legal right grants an individual 
the power of control over the commercial use of his or her very identity—
it does not just ensure that this identity is protected from being portrayed 
in a manner that is potentially invasive or that could invoke emotional 
stress.  Because of this nuanced difference, the law of privacy is 
inadequate to cover the use of real-life identities in either fact or fiction-
based media portrayals. 
In Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Company,48 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, entertainer Lillian Reis, had no 
right over the publication of an article about her in the Saturday Evening 
Post, which detailed how she was charged with having been the 
mastermind of a large burglary.  The court explained that “[t]he flaw in 
plaintiff’s position is that a public figure has no exclusive rights to his or 
her own life story, and others need no consent or permission of the subject 
to write a biography of a celebrity.”49  The court analyzed this case 
through a privacy lens, determining that no privacy rights are owed to 
publicly known figures whose actions are already on full display in the 
public eye, and therefore already provided unrestricted knowledge to any 
person who chooses to integrate these actions or this person into a work.50  
However, this case is distinguishable from other right of privacy or right 
of publicity life story cases since this case involves a news report as 
opposed to a work of fiction or creative expression.  News reports should 
be granted more freedom and protection than creative works because they 
are relevant to public interest and the need for the successful 
 
 44  Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902). 
 45  William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 46  Id. at 384. 
 47  Id. at 406. 
 48  Corabi v. Curtis Pub. Co., 273 A.2d 899, 912 (Pa. 1971). 
 49  Id. at 919. 
 50  Id. 
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dissemination of public knowledge. 
False light and defamation are also integral aspects of privacy rights.  
False light concerns the protection of an interest that is reputational and 
contains the same “overtones of mental distress” as are required for a 
successful pleading of defamation.51  But, whereas public disclosure of 
private facts involves truthful statements, false light involves either 
invented or misleading facts that place an individual in a false light and 
are highly offensive through an objective lens.52  A story can be true, thus 
eliminating the application of a false light or defamation claim, but still 
violate the right of publicity since it is being appropriated without 
consent—a key factor of any right of publicity violation. 
Likewise, the court in Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.53 warned of the 
dangers of confusing “privacy” with “personality,” and explained that the 
plaintiff, Warren Spahn, a celebrated baseball player, was a “public 
personality” and that “insofar as his professional career is involved, he is 
substantially without a right to privacy.”  However, Judge Keating went 
on to explain “[t]hat is not to say . . . that his ‘personality’ may be 
fictionalized and that . . . it may be exploited for the defendants’ 
commercial benefit through the medium of an unauthorized biography.”54 
ii. Why the Right of Publicity is the Best Equipped Legal and 
Equitable Remedy for Life Story Appropriations 
The right of publicity has been analyzed in the context of use of 
persona in “stories” for several decades; however, no court or legislature 
has created a uniform method for applying this legal right in these 
circumstances, which is in dire need of remediation.  In his treatise on 
publicity rights, J. Thomas McCarthy theorized that “perhaps no aspect 
of the rights of privacy and publicity has been perceived as being as 
cloudy and muddled as liability for the use of persons’ identities in 
‘stories,’ whether denominated as ‘fiction,’ ‘faction,’ or ‘docudrama.’”55  
The term “docudrama” has been described as “a type of film or 
novelization in which real-life events are embellished with fictional 
dramatic events.”56  Docudramas, as a form of entertainment, have been 
in existence since the early twentieth century, with many sources 
 
 51  Prosser, supra note 45, at 400. 
 52  Prosser, supra note 45, at 400. 
 53  Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 543, 545 (N.Y. 1966). 
 54  Id. 
 55  Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing J. Thomas 
McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, § 8.9[A] (1988)).  
 56  Ruffin-Steinback v. de Passe, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (citing 
J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, § 8.9[A] n.2 (1988)). 
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crediting this to producer Louis de Rochemont, who created The March 
of Time, a documentary-dramatization film series about World War II, 
which contributed to the genre’s popularity.57  Docudramas differ from 
historical fiction in that they do not simply create fictionalized tales 
grounded in a realistic era, but instead take advantage of existing people, 
places, and things that serve as the “characters” in these tales.58 
Most recently, in a case decided in February 2016, the Ninth Circuit 
held that there is no right to publicity in life stories as such stories are not 
a form of purely commercial speech, and the alleged publicity holder did 
not “make the investment required to produce a performance of interest 
to the public” or “invest time and money to build up economic value in a 
marketable performance or identity.”59  In Sarver v. Chartier,60 Mark 
Boal, a journalist for Playboy magazine, shadowed the plaintiff, Army 
Sergeant Jeffrey Sarver, who served as one of approximately 150 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (“EOD”) technicians in Iraq.  Boal wrote 
an article about Sarver’s life and experiences in Iraq for both Playboy and 
Reader’s Digest.61  Prior to the events of this lawsuit, Sarver claimed that 
he “never consented to the use of his name and likeness” in the article, 
and that he “objected to it after reviewing an advance copy.”62  After the 
article was published, Boal wrote the screenplay for the June 2009 film 
The Hurt Locker.63  Sarver alleges that the film’s main character is based 
on his life and experiences, that “characteristics of [the main character] 
and events in the movie . . . mirror his life story,” that this was done 
without his consent, and several scenes portray him in a false manner, 
which has damaged his reputation.64  Sarver sued for misappropriation of 
his likeness and right of publicity along with a number of other privacy 
and contractual claims.65  The case was dismissed under California’s anti-
SLAPP statute, which allowed the defendants to claim that the film 
depicted an issue of “public importance” worth broadcasting and 
defeating Sarver’s publicity rights.66 
In analyzing the anti-SLAPP claims, Judge O’Scannlain sided with 
 
 57  ALAN ROSENTHAL, WHY DOCUDRAMA?: FACT-FICTION OF FILM AND TV 65 (1999). 
 58  STEVEN N. LIPKIN, REAL EMOTIONAL LOGIC: FILM AND TELEVISION DOCUDRAMA AS 
PERSUASIVE PRACTICE 64 (2002) (“Docudrama[s] . . . are, of course, offering us some actual 
person’s ‘true story.’”). 
 59  Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 905 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 60  Id. at 896. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id.  
 64  Id. 
 65  Sarver, 813 F.3d at 896. 
 66  Id. at 897, 899.  
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the defendants who contended that the Iraq War was a matter of 
“significant and sustained public attention,” as was the use of improvised 
explosive devices during the war and that, therefore, the subject matter of 
the film was one of public concern.67  However, Sarver felt that this 
application was too broad and, instead, asked the court not to analyze 
whether the war was of public interest, but whether Sarver’s private 
persona was of public interest.68  The plaintiff argued that this standard 
would not satisfy the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis: a prima facie 
showing that the defendants’ actions are related to a “public issue in 
furtherance of the defendant’s right to free speech.”69 
Ultimately, the court concluded that the “nature of Sarver’s 
occupation and the context in which his alleged portrayal appears” in the 
film and the “significant attention devoted to the war” contributed to the 
film being one of public concern.70  The court held that while the film 
“allegedly incorporates personal characteristics of Sarver—for example 
his appearance, his temperament, and parts of his biography—such 
characteristics are displayed only in the context of the character’s 
experiences fighting in Iraq.”71 
However, what the court failed to acknowledge was that this 
appropriation, whether or not directly relevant to the film’s public interest 
elements, was still appropriative of Sarver’s identity.  A more applicable 
test is the one that Sarver suggested: inquiring whether the persona at 
issue was of so-called public concern rather than if the subject matter of 
a given dramatization was of concern.72  This would allow for the rise of 
right of publicity claims to be recognized in the case of life story 
misappropriation when the issue is the misuse of the persona at the center 
of the film, rather than the particular era or subject matter of the film.  A 
prime example of this is the difference between historical fiction and 
docudramas; whereas the former is perfectly acceptable when authors 
take creative license to write works that are grounded entirely in fiction 
and merely set in a realistic world, the latter would involve taking an 
existing subject and fictionalizing his or her life.73  Additionally, this 
would not stifle a screenwriter’s ability to create a film about a subject 
matter of public concern; it would only limit the author’s ability to create 
 
 67  Id. at 902. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. at 901-02.  
 70  Id. at 902. 
 71  Sarver, 813 F.3d at 902. 
 72  Id. 
 73  ROSENTHAL, supra note 57. 
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a film that is based upon another’s life.74 
A bedrock copyright case decided by the Supreme Court declared 
that originality is the “sine qua non” of copyright.75  While publicity 
rights are not a codified element of copyright law, statutory rights of 
publicity would be more salutary if they adopted a similar approach of 
analyzing originality when determining whether a docudrama violates a 
subject’s right of publicity.  Life stories, by their very nature, are not 
original.  If an expressive work is so closely related to a subject’s life, 
through connections that are distinct and remarkable, then a subject’s 
right of publicity has been violated, even if the character’s novel name or 
the fictionalized dialogue is stripped away.  Creating a legislatively 
proscribed list of factors for a court to weigh in deciding whether or not 
a work is appropriative would be the most judicious way to ensure that 
all generators of creative works are put on notice of what is and is not 
statutorily permissible.  This could assist in closing the doors to litigious 
claims by informing those creating films, television shows, or novels that 
use real life stories as their basis, of what is infringing and what is 
allowable.  Additionally, if a claim does reach the courts, this checklist 
would provide judges with an equally streamlined process by which to 
decide where the case falls on the spectrum of appropriating a persona to 
providing a story with subject matter that is of public concern.  Factors, 
such as results from a viewer perception survey detailing facts of the 
individual and showing the artistic work, the number of physical and 
circumstantial similarities between the character at issue and his real-life 
counterpart, the existence of a prior relationship between the plaintiff and 
defendant, or the use of one’s own name, would be beneficial to both 
lawmakers as well as the judiciary.76  This would provide the opportunity 
to certify that the restrictions are neither too strict for potential defendants 
nor violative of First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and 
expression, and would carve out exceptions for merely coincidental 
occurrences. 
In copyright law, in order to prove infringement, a plaintiff must 
 
 74  In 1913, the New York Court of Appeals held that a film based upon plaintiff’s heroic 
actions was a “series of pictures [that] were not true pictures of a current event but mainly a 
product of the imagination, based, however, largely upon such information relating to an 
actual occurrence as could readily be obtained.”  Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 103 N.E. 
1108, 1110 (N.Y. 1913).  Here, the New York Court of Appeals drew an early distinction 
between “news” and “entertainment,” finding that there is no cause of action in the former, 
but that there may be one in the latter.  Id. 
 75  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 76  Courts may also consider weighing whether or not the creative work makes use of an 
overt and prominent disclaimer—stating that there is no connection to or endorsement by the 
real-life subjects of the film and that any dialogue, events, or characteristics portrayed are 
purely fictionalized. 
BEACH 2017 
144 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 42:1 
show that the defendant has copied the work in question, and then 
demonstrate that the defendant’s work improperly appropriates the 
plaintiff’s work by substantiating that the “intended audience” will 
recognize substantial similarities between the two.77  Courts have found 
that the test for determining improper appropriation should be equivalent 
to that of a “spectator,” who would rely upon the “complex of his 
impressions” in deciding if there is uncanny similarity.78  If the audience 
would perceive that the individual whose life story is the foundation for 
the creative work must have “endorsed” the film or book, or must have 
an affiliation with it due to the striking similarities, this should be 
sufficient to set out the case for a right of publicity violation.  While the 
work may not be a “commercial” one in the traditional sense, if it 
impinges upon the individual’s opportunity to create his own work based 
upon his life story by saturating the market with the same tale, this would 
create an economic ripple effect that should also serve to allow for a 
showing of misappropriation. 
Other courts have held that copying has occurred if the defendant 
has sufficient “access” to the plaintiff’s work and thus produced a 
“substantially similar” product by virtue of this access.79  Of course, a 
defendant could not be accused of “copying” a plaintiff’s life story if he 
or she was not familiar with it or did not have access to the story, which 
would shield mere coincidences.80  De minimis similarities would also 
fail to qualify as appropriations in the eyes of the law.81  Applying these 
 
 77  See e.g., Airframe Sys. v. L-3 Communs. Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 106 n.7 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(“Where . . . the copyrighted work involves specialized subject matter, such as a computer 
program, some courts have held that the ‘ordinary observer’ is a member of the work’s 
‘intended audience’ who possesses ‘specialized expertise.’”). 
 78  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 79  Warner Bros. v. ABC, 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[I]t is well settled that 
copying may be inferred where a plaintiff establishes that the defendant had access to the 
copyrighted work and that the two works are substantially similar.”). 
 80  See e.g., Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Enter. Inc., 581 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 
2009) (“To prove access, a plaintiff must show a reasonable possibility, not merely a bare 
possibility, that an alleged infringer had the chance to view the protected work. . . . Where 
there is no direct evidence of access, circumstantial evidence can be used to prove access 
either by (1) establishing a chain of events linking the plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s 
access, or (2) showing that the plaintiff’s work has been widely disseminated.”); see also 
Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1988) (“striking similarity . . . must 
extend beyond themes that could have been derived from a common source or themes that are 
so trite as to be likely to reappear in many compositions”). 
 81  Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De Minimis and A Proposal For Its Application in 
Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 945, 947 (2006) (“De minimis non curat lex is commonly 
translated as ‘the law does not concern itself with trifles.’”).  New York courts have made use 
of an “incidental use” exception for life story portrayals, which tests if the plaintiff “was the 
sole or a primary subject of the allegedly fictitious work” or instead if the portrayal was merely 
“incidental, momentary, [or] isolated.”  Ladany v. William Morrow & Co., 465 F. Supp. 870, 
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confines in the right of publicity context on a case-by-case basis would 
assist in ensuring that appropriation is found only in specific 
circumstances; either when the defendant had “direct” and apparent 
access to the plaintiff’s life story, or when an intended audience, who 
observed both the allegedly infringing work and the circumstances of the 
persona’s life, would find the two to be “substantially similar” and thus 
probative of impermissible appropriation. 
However, there must be affirmative defenses for alleged 
appropriators, and one such exception must exist for “transformative” 
uses.  The Copyright Clause sets forth four “fair use” limitations on the 
exclusive rights to a copyrighted work: (1) the purpose and character of 
the use; (2) the nature of the work; (3) the amount and substantiality of 
the used portion in relation to the whole work; and (4) the effect of the 
use in relation to the potential market for or value of the work.82  Under 
the first element, a work is protected as “fair use” if it does not “supersede 
the objects” of the original creation, but instead is transformative by 
“[adding] something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”83  A fair use 
defense would grant privileges to a rights-holder that are not too broad 
and do not restrict the open marketplace of ideas.  This would ensure that 
aspects that represent only a mere modicum of the individual’s persona 
are not policed and prevented from use under the First Amendment 
freedoms. 
While parody remains a protected form of free speech under “fair 
use” doctrines, there is a difference between parody, which is 
transformative, and life stories, which are either directly taken from 
someone else’s own life, or greatly lifted with slight fictionalization.84  If 
the work is so transformative as to render the connection between the 
real-life individual and the character in the artistic piece, then the First 
Amendment protections would apply and safeguard the work.  However, 
the First Amendment protections are not a shield to defamation claims in 
biopics and docudramas.85 
In the past, courts have grappled with the issue of whether or not the 
 
880-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 82  17 U.S.C. § 107 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61.). 
 83  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 84  § 107 (proscribing protection for the purpose and character of the use under the fair 
use umbrella). 
 85  See e.g., Eriq Gardner, Viacom Headed to Trial over TLC Biopic, THE HOLLYWOOD 
REP. (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/viacom-headed-trial-tlc-
biopic-931125; see also Peter Libbey, Olivia de Havilland Files Lawsuit Over ‘Feud’ 
Portrayal, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/02/arts/olivia-de-
havilland-files-lawsuit-over-feud-portrayal.html. 
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scope of the right of publicity depends upon the “fictional or non-fictional 
character of the work,” thus providing a useful context of when 
transformation would be sufficient.86  In Ruffin-Steinback v. de Passe, 87 
plaintiffs sued for infringement of their right of publicity over a mini-
series docudrama depicting the story of the Motown group “The 
Temptations,” which was based upon a novel written by Otis Williams, 
one of the founding members of the group.  The district court cited the 
Michigan Supreme Court, which has recognized a tort claim for 
“appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiffs name or 
likeness.”88  However, since the court had not yet decided a life story 
appropriation claim, it chose to adopt the Restatement of Unfair 
Competition’s view, which provides that “‘for purposes of trade’ does not 
ordinarily include the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, 
commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in 
advertising that is incidental to such uses.”89  The court went on to cite to 
the Restatement’s comment (c), which states that “[u]se of another’s 
identity in a novel, play, or motion picture is also not ordinarily an 
infringement.”90 
However, while the Restatements are intended as valuable treatises 
written by legal scholars and professionals, they are merely persuasive 
and are not binding authority.91  And, since the Supreme Court has yet to 
hear a case on right of publicity in life story claims and Congress has yet 
to enact a statute that addresses a uniform right of publicity law, the 
Restatement does not provide a clear-cut answer for judges tackling this 
issue. 
A Fifth Circuit case, Matthews v. Wozencraft,92 concerned the 
publication of a novel involving a fictionalized version of the plaintiff.  
The court held that “the term ‘likeness’ does not include general incidents 
from a person’s life” and that the “narrative of an individual’s life, 
standing alone, lacks the value of a name or likeness that the 
misappropriation tort protects.”93  The court distinguished name and 
likeness from life story, by explaining that “[u]nlike the goodwill 
associated with one’s name or likeness, the facts of an individual’s life 
 
 86  Ruffin-Steinback v. de Passe, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
 87  Id. at 726. 
 88  Id. at 728. 
 89  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
 90  Id. 
 91  See generally Kristin David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the 
Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205, 205 (2007) (describing the role of the legal “Restatement 
movement”). 
 92  Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 93  Id. at 438. 
BEACH 2017 
2017] FACT & FICTION 147 
possess no intrinsic value that will deteriorate with repeated use.”94 
But the right of publicity is not only an economic right, but a moral 
one as well, and therefore a plaintiff should have the ability to control 
how his or her “likeness” and “persona” is used.  An intellectual property 
owner should be allowed a right that is parallel to the one given to a 
homeowner in real property who is allowed to grant others permission to 
come onto his property and restrict others from trespassing. 95  In the 
intellectual property realm, the right should exist to allow an owner to 
dictate the use of his own “persona,” which should encompass events that 
occurred in his life that were unique to him.96  This would not broaden 
publicity rights too much.  The unique facts and circumstances of one’s 
life are just as integral to one’s persona as one’s name or face.  But in 
order to prevent widespread claims of misuse, a life story rights-holder 
who is not already in the public eye should be required to show a 
preexisting and fiduciary relationship between himself and the author of 
the creative work that was produced using his story.  Therefore, purely 
coincidental incidences will not be penalized; characters that appear in 
novels or films that experience vaguely similar events or have vaguely 
similar personality or physical characteristics or traits to real-life 
counterparts will not be punished as infringing the right of publicity.  But, 
if a relationship already exists between the author and the person whom 
the character is based upon, such as in the case of Sarver or Matthews, 
this is sufficient evidence that the creative works do not merely display 
coincidental similarities, but rather are intentional, and thus infringing of 
the individual’s ability to control the use and portrayal of his persona on 
film or in a novel.97 
In a case before the D.C. district court, David Whitehead claimed 
that the movie Mission: Impossible was based upon a book that he wrote 
detailing his time in the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) and that this 
infringed upon his privacy rights.98  The court concurred with the 
Matthews court, and explained that even if the plaintiff “could establish 
that either of the movies was based on his life story, which he cannot, 
there is no tort for invasion of privacy for appropriating the story of 
 
 94  Id. 
 95  See e.g., J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
711, 721 (1996); see also Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back 
Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 377 (2003) (discussing how property law can be interpreted 
as a bundle of rights, which includes the right to exclude). 
 96  See e.g., Penner, supra note 95; see also Mossoff, supra note 95. 
 97  See Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Matthews, 15 F.3d 
at 432. 
 98  Whitehead v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 38, 40-41 (D.D.C. 1999). 
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another person’s life.”99  However, the district court here did not extend 
its analysis to an application of whether there even is an economic value 
in one’s life story that will be impacted by nonconsensual use.  This court 
solely analyzed the case through the lens of the right of privacy, not the 
right of publicity, and thus neglected to address this pivotal issue. 
In failing to address economics in life story works, courts have 
missed the opportunity to determine that the right of publicity extends 
beyond merely “commercial” uses particularly in the context of 
advertisements.  In 1989, actress and dancer Ginger Rogers sued an 
Italian filmmaker over a film entitled Ginger and Fred that featured a 
dancing duo as its stars.100  The Second Circuit held that “the title ‘Ginger 
and Fred’ is clearly related to the content of the movie and is not a 
disguised advertisement for the sale of goods or services or a collateral 
commercial product” and is therefore permissible.101  A similar case, 
Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc.,102 held that it was irrelevant whether 
the work in question was “properly described as a biography, a fictional 
biography, or any other kind of literary work,” and that it was not the 
court’s responsibility to “pass on literary categories, or literary 
judgment,” declaring that it was enough “that the book is a literary work 
and not simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of 
goods or services.”  These declarations—that expressive works cannot be 
commercial—are inherently dangerous and open the door to a potential 
parade of horribles.  By granting any future screenwriter or novelist the 
ability to literally appropriate the exact circumstances, events, names, or 
even lines of dialogue that have been spoken by an individual, and to 
make use of them without that individual’s consent, courts allow these 
authors to monopolize on the lives of others. 
Even if creative works are not strictly “commercial” in the 
advertising sense, the creators of these works still directly profit from 
them.  These circumstances are distinguishable from right-of-publicity 
cases that involve the use of celebrity names in recorded works or images 
in social media.103  These circumstances, whether appropriative or not, 
 
 99  Id. at 53. 
 100  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 101  Id. at 1005. 
 102  Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). 
 103  See, e.g., Lindsay Lohan Loses Lawsuit Against Pitbull, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 23, 
2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/lindsay-lohan-loses-lawsuit-against-pitbull-
20130223 (reporting that Lindsay Lohan’s claim against Pitbull for the line “got it locked up 
like Lindsay Lohan” as a violation of her publicity rights was dismissed since it was not used 
for “advertising” or “trade”); see also Eriq Gardner, Katherine Heigl Ends Lawsuit Over 
Duane Reade Tweet (Exclusive), THE HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 27, 2014, 12:20 PM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/katherine-heigl-ends-lawsuit-duane-728552 
(discussing Katherine Heigl’s settlement with Duane Reade for tweeting a paparazzi image 
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do not usurp the entirety of another’s personal life and individualized, 
unique circumstances.  This distinction invites the need for legislative 
action through the amendment of right of publicity statutes to provide for 
protection for those whose lives are impermissibly portrayed in film, on 
television, or in text, in order to prevent the unjust enrichment that would 
undoubtedly occur if lawmakers granted authors permission to profit 
from writing stories revolving around other peoples’ lives. 
Life story right of publicity cases are not confined solely to cases 
involving unknown individuals, and can extend to both living and 
deceased celebrities.  In 1979, Rudolph Valentino’s nephew attempted to 
bar a television broadcast entitled Legend of Valentino: A Romantic 
Fiction for violating his uncle’s right of publicity.104  The Supreme Court 
of California dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, but Chief 
Justice Bird explained, on behalf of himself and two concurring justices, 
that, in resolving the question of right of publicity infringement, the 
“context and nature of the use is of preeminent concern.”105  The Chief 
Justice posited that the “range of free expression” would be 
“meaningfully reduced if prominent persons in the present and recent past 
were forbidden topics for the imaginations of authors of fiction.”106  But 
“forbidding” the use of an existing persona is not something that should 
be done wholesale. Instead, it should be done in a selective manner.  
Namely, authors should not be restricted completely from mentioning or 
alluding to celebrities in their creative works—but they should also not 
permit works centered solely around a celebrity’s persona without prior 
consent.  Chief Justice Bird noted that the circumstance would be 
different if respondents had “published Rudolph Valentino’s Cookbook 
and neither the recipes nor the menus described in the book were in any 
fashion related to Rudolph Valentino,” but since the broadcast at issue 
was not “wholly unrelated,” the right of publicity did not apply.107  This 
method of analysis is erroneous because it attributes liability to the 
defendant based upon the manner of use of the individual’s name.  In 
works involving a celebrity’s life story, the work is infringing of the 
celebrity’s right of publicity if it is about the celebrity in such a manner 
that makes it indistinguishable in the eyes of the viewer.  In amending 
right of publicity legislation, lawmakers should put to rest this distinction 
by using express language that clarifies that, if a work is solely about an 
individual, then it violates the right of publicity.  But on the other hand, 
 
of Heigl leaving one of its stores with a shopping bag). 
 104  Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg, Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 455-56 (Cal. 1979). 
 105  Id. at 457 (Bird, C.J., concurring). 
 106  Id. at 460. 
 107  Id. at 457 n.6. 
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if a work merely mentions a celebrity or has one character who is vaguely 
similar to a well-known individual, then the First Amendment’s freedom 
of expression, which permits creators to put forth works into the artistic 
marketplace without infringing upon others’ rights, should safeguard it. 
In another case involving a noted persona, Agatha Christie’s estate 
sued defendants for making Agatha, a movie that told a fictionalized 
account of a true incident in Christie’s life.108  The court found that the 
question of infringement hinges upon “the absence or presence of 
deliberate falsifications” through a defendant’s attempt to present the 
disputed events as true, and that this determines “whether the scales in 
this balancing process, shall tip in favor of or against protection of the 
speech at issue.”109  The court found that in this situation “it is evident to 
the public that the events so depicted are fictitious;” but that assumption 
was a slippery slope, considering the lack of concrete evidence showing 
how the public actually perceived the events.110  This is why a heighted 
evidentiary standard and burden of proof for a potential plaintiff would 
prevent a guessing game about whether or not the fictionalized elements 
of a docudrama sufficiently distinguish a work from an already well-
known celebrity’s life story. 
The addition of life story rights under the right of publicity umbrella 
would not stifle creativity.  After receiving contractually granted consent 
from the subject, one could still create a biopic about a celebrity or write 
a piece of fiction that is heavily inspired by an actual person, just as 
brands may use celebrity spokespeople once they obtain consent or 
provide compensation.  This would help close the door to litigation as 
name and likeness protections for commercial speech helped prevent 
companies from appropriating celebrity images to sell their products. 
Additionally, the ability to control life rights in various media should 
also depend upon what damages the plaintiff seeks: injunctive relief or 
monetary relief.  In a famous 1994 suit between Elizabeth Taylor and 
NBC, Taylor sought an injunction to prevent the airing of an unauthorized 
biopic.  In his decision, Judge Wayne called this injunction an 
“unconstitutional prior restraint” on expression, regardless of the fact that 
the miniseries could be a commercial success for NBC.111  Judge Wayne 
claimed that Taylor might be able to bring an action for monetary 
damages after the program aired, but she could not attempt to restrict the 
 
 108  Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 109  Id. at 433. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Judge Refuses to Block Miniseries About Elizabeth Taylor, REP. COMM. FOR FREEDOM 
OF THE PRESS (Sept. 20, 1994), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/ news/judge 
-refuses-block-miniseries-about-elizabeth-taylor. 
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program from broadcasting in the first place.112  Overall, the focus should 
not necessarily be about plaintiffs attempting to chill speech and create a 
restraint on expression, but instead about plaintiffs receiving due credit 
and compensation for works that are either directly about them or heavily 
inspired by them. 
B. An Actor’s Ownership in the Fictional Characters That He or 
She Brings to Life 
Right of publicity statutes should protect fictional characters, since 
many actors are indivisible from the characters that they play.  Again, 
these statutes would heavily limit protection to characters that the actor 
solely creates and that are indistinguishable from the actor.  Such 
protections would require a high burden of proof whereby plaintiffs must 
show that the public intrinsically associates an image of that character 
with the celebrity.  Lawmakers should also limit this right to images of 
characters where the physical features are strikingly similar to the actor, 
and not extend the right to mere character name usage alone with no 
corresponding likeness appropriation.  This right would exist mostly in 
the context of commercial advertising where there is a current trend of 
brands utilizing fictional characters to advertise products.  Recently, the 
National Association of Realtors aired a series of commercials featuring 
the character Phil Dunphy from Modern Family.113  This is not a question 
of copyright or trademark—who owns the character—but rather a 
publicity question that would require a determination of who is allowed 
to economize on the use of a character’s image. 
An important inquiry in fictional character publicity rights is 
whether or not the actor who would claim possession of the right has been 
the sole portrayer of the character in an audiovisual medium.  In Lugosi 
v. Universal Pictures,  Bela Lugosi’s heirs brought a suit against 
Universal Pictures to enjoin the company from using images of Lugosi in 
character as Count Dracula for the commercial sale of products.114  When 
the case reached the California Supreme Court, the majority ruled against 
Lugosi’s heirs because too many actors have portrayed the character of 
Count Dracula over the years.115  In his concurrence, Justice Mosk 
clarified that the rule should not state that an actor “can never retain a 
 
 112  Id. 
 113  Nathalie Tadena, ‘Modern Family’ Teams Up with National Association of Realtors 
in Integration Deal, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/modern-family-
teams-up-with-national-association-of-realtors-in-integration-deal-1462449601. 
 114  Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 427 (Cal. 1979). 
 115  Id. 
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proprietary interest in a characterization.”116  Instead, he felt that “[a]n 
original creation of a fictional figure played exclusively by its creator 
may well be protectable.”117  Justice Mosk cited Groucho Marx, Red 
Skelton, and the “unique personal creations” of Abbott and Costello as 
examples of figures worthy of protection of the law, since these actors 
have taken sufficient measures to qualify for publicity rights.118  
Furthermore, according to Justice Mosk, courts should grant such rights 
based upon the talent, work, and effort that one puts into cultivating the 
image of the individual claiming the right.119 
The Third Circuit in McFarland v. Miller,120 extended this ideology 
further by claiming that originality is not the only piece in the puzzle, but 
that courts should also consider the “association with the real life actor.”  
In a suit between the actor who portrayed Spunky McFarland on the 
television program Our Gang and the owner of a restaurant named 
Spunky McFarland, the court sided with the former, stating “[w]here an 
actor’s screen persona becomes so associated with him that it becomes 
inseparable from the actor’s own public image, the actor obtains an 
interest in the image which gives him standing to prevent mere interlopers 
from using it without authority.”121  This prevention of unjust enrichment 
should extend to actors for the fictional characters that they portray, and 
further solidifies the right of publicity as both a moral and an economic 
right that applies whether or not profit is involved.122  If an objective 
third-party could reasonably believe that the actor endorses a product or 
a restaurant or a brand through the use of a character name or image that 
he is intrinsically associated with, then the unauthorized use of the 
character name or image is inappropriate, and the infringing party should 
be held liable.123 
If actors portray themselves or develop their own characters, they 
should be granted a proprietary right.  The court concurred with this 
ideology in Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,124 holding that there were 
no imitation claims when an actor was responsible for cultivating his or 
 
 116  Id. at 432 (Mosk, J., concurring). 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id.  
 120  McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 121  Id. 
 122  Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: A Property 
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 49 (1994) (discussing both the moral and 
economic injuries that plaintiffs incur as a result of unauthorized use). 
 123  Id. at 50 (discussing the resulting harm from consumer deception). 
 124  Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that 
publicity rights extended to actors Laurel and Hardy for developing their own characters). 
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her own character, and therefore the actor deserves protection.  Just as it 
is unjust enrichment for a brand to monopolize on an entertainer’s 
persona, it would be equally unjust to profit off of a fictional character 
that an actor spent time and talent creating and cultivating, so that it could 
linger and make an impact in the public’s mind, obviously great enough 
to warrant commercialization.  Courts have even gone as far as to enjoin 
misappropriation of a persona that an actor cultivated through the 
portrayal of a character.125  This paradigm sufficiently demands 
uniformity through statutory right of publicity laws. 
Arguably one of the most famous right of publicity cases involves 
litigation between Wheel of Fortune hostess Vanna White and technology 
giant Samsung Electronics.126  The case involved the distribution of an 
advertisement campaign for Samsung that featured a series of popular 
culture phenomena beside Samsung products.127  The theme of the 
campaign was that Samsung would still be a popular brand well into the 
twenty-first century.128  The advertisement in question featured a golden-
hued robot donning a pink satin gown, blonde wig, and diamond necklace 
and bracelet and posed in front of Wheel of Fortune’s letter game board 
set in the middle of turning one of the letters.129  The text “Longest-
running game show. 2012 A.D.” was inscribed underneath the image.130  
Samsung executives referred to the advertisement as the “Vanna White” 
ad.131 
The Ninth Circuit majority held that the advertisement in question 
was appropriative.132  The court spent a great portion of its opinion 
clarifying that “[t]he right of publicity does not require that 
appropriations of identity be accomplished through particular means to 
be actionable.”133  Judge Goodwin, writing for the majority, seemed 
concerned with distinguishing between the manner of the appropriation, 
and if an appropriation had even occurred in the first place.134  In a right 
of publicity case, the mere fact that any appropriation occurred is 
 
 125  Allen v. Men’s World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[t]he 
copy evoked the ‘schlemiel’ persona Allen cultivated up through his appearance in Annie 
Hall”). 
 126  White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 127  Id. at 1396. 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. 
 132  White, 971 F.2d at 1399. 
 133 Id. at 1398. 
 134  Id. (“It is not important how the defendant has appropriated the plaintiff’s identity, but 
whether the defendant has done so.”). 
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sufficient to warrant defendant liability, even if there was no explicit use 
of the plaintiff’s name or direct image.135  Judge Goodwin feared that if 
the court, or legislation, limited the right of publicity to a laundry list of 
violating usages, then enterprising advertisers would merely think up 
creative new ways to appropriate a person’s identity in a manner that is 
not on the proscribed list.136  This can also be true for character 
appropriations, which are not “traditional” means of appropriation 
inscribed in existing statutory provisions.137  However, such character 
appropriations are still deserving of protection from clever advertisers 
who could find new ways to appropriate well-known celebrity personas 
by merely creating images that resemble the celebrity’s famous character 
as opposed to the celebrity herself. 
It can be argued that in White, the use of a robot dressed as Vanna 
White was an appropriation of a “character” that White played on 
television, with the placement of that “character” in a place where 
viewer’s would expect to see it—in front of the show’s set.138  Vanna 
White, the real-life person, does not, presumably, spend all of her waking 
time positioned in front of a letter board, draped in a gown and dripping 
with jewels.  But the “character” that White portrays on a televised game 
show is one that she has been intrinsically associated with since 1982.139  
It is enough if a brand “directly implicate[s] the commercial interests 
which the right of publicity is designed to protect.”140  And in 
appropriating her identity, or her “character’s” identity, Samsung has 
implicated the commercial interest that White has in choosing 
endorsements for herself and her character. 
The Ninth Circuit heard a case brought by two actors from the 
television show Cheers who claimed that animatronic robots modeled to 
look like their characters and placed in airport bars infringed upon their 
publicity rights.141  The circuit court found that there were enough 
 
 135  Id. (explaining the impossibility of treating the right of publicity as guarding only 
against a laundry list of specific means of appropriating identity). 
 136  Id. 
 137  See e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Westlaw current through Ch. 685 of 2017 Reg. Sess.) 
(California’s right of publicity statute). 
 138  White, 971 F.2d at 1398. 
 139  See Lily Rothman, 6 Vanna White Facts to Blow Your Mind as Wheel of Fortune 
Celebrates 6,000 Episodes, TIME (Apr. 25, 2014), http://time.com/76710/wheel-of-fortune-
vanna-white-6000/; see also Steve Baron, Syndicated TV Ratings: ‘Wheel of Fortune’ Tops 
Households & Viewers; ‘Dr. Phil’ Leads Talkers for Week Ending April 26, 2015, TV BY 
THE NUMBERS (May 5, 2015), http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/sdsdskdh279882992z1/synd 
icated-tv-ratings-wheel-of-fortune-tops-households-dr-phil-leads-talkers-for-week-ending-
april-26-2015/. 
 140  White, 971 F.2d at 1398. 
 141  Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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similarities between the characters’ and the robots’ “physical 
characteristics” for the actors to bring an appropriation claim.142  It could 
not, however, be argued that the robots were intended to conjure up 
images of the actors George Wendt and John Ratzenberger, but rather the 
characters Norm Peterson and Cliff Clavin, respectively.143  The court’s 
ruling has created a general understanding that characters can be just as 
lucrative in marketing as real-life celebrity persona. 
Adding right of publicity to a character or an actor’s role could also 
assist in solving the joint authorship problem that arises when actors 
claim copyright in a role that they inhabited.  In a 2015 case involving 
such a debate, the Ninth Circuit held that an actress’s claim to own 
copyright in her film performance would “splinter a movie into many 
different ‘works,’ even in the absence of an independent fixation.”144  
Copyright is not sufficient to resolve this conundrum.  Instead, right of 
publicity legislation that acknowledges ownership of character 
performance—in terms of its potential usage in the commercial context 
and the evocation of false endorsement—would fulfill the right of 
publicity’s aim of preventing unjust enrichment and granting a 
proprietary right to individuals for the persona that they have cultivated 
based upon their talent or notoriety. 
C. Competing Equities: Right of Publicity vs. Right of Freedom of 
Expression 
There are inevitably various competing equities in right of publicity 
legislation and litigation.  On the one hand, the publicity holder wants the 
ability to monopolize his or her persona; and on the other hand, the 
external agents seek the ability to express their freedom of speech and 
expression under the First Amendment.145  Because of this, it is 
unsurprising that prior cases have called upon the circuit courts to 
ascertain the line between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment.146  These cases usually involved the debate about whether 
 
 142  Id. 
 143  Cheers (Paramount Network Television 1982); see also Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811. 
 144  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Simply put, as Google 
claimed, it ‘make[s] Swiss cheese of copyrights.’”). 
 145  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances”). 
 146  See e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003) (artist 
created a painting commemorating Tiger Woods’ victory at the Masters Tournament); Titan 
Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1989) (magazine published 
commercial posters of wrestlers without consent); ABG EPE IP LLC v. Fabbrica d’Armi 
Pietro Beretta S.p.A., No. 2:14-cv-02263 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2014) (use of Elvis 
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or not commercial speech is involved.147  Additionally, there must be a 
need for First Amendment protection to apply in a given case, such as 
creatively “transforming” a given known persona and applying it in a new 
way.148  Merely utilizing a well-known celebrity’s likeness or name, for 
the purposes of trade or commercial exploits, should not be sufficient to 
claim freedom of speech under constitutional safeguards. 
Rogers v. Grimaldi involved a film that Ginger Rogers claimed 
appropriated her name in its title.149  The court stated that “movies, plays, 
books, and songs are all indisputably works of artistic expression and 
deserve protection.”150  However, the court clarified that “they are also 
sold in the commercial marketplace like other more utilitarian products, 
making the danger of consumer deception a legitimate concern that 
warrants some government regulation.”151  Other cases have held that 
First Amendment protections are “not limited to written or spoken words, 
but include[] other mediums of expression, including music, pictures, 
films, photographs, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints, and 
sculptures.”152 
Judge Kozinski, writing for the dissent in White, posited that 
“[i]ntellectual property rights aren’t free” but instead are “imposed at the 
expense of future creators and of the public at large.”153  He went on to 
 
impersonators at trade shows). 
 147  Julia Child Found. v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16CV02626 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 21, 2016) 
(use of Julia Child’s name in Airbnb’s marketing materials for a villa in France); see also 
Keith Harris, Can Taylor Swift Sue Kanye West Over ‘Famous’ Video?, ROLLING STONE (June 
29, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/can-taylor-swift-sue-kanye-west-over-
famous-video-20160629 (discussing whether rights of publicity can exist over the use of 
celebrity likeness via wax figures in a music video in which there is no commercial loss); 
Faulkner v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 15-6518 (KSH)(CLW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95638 (D.N.J. 
July 21, 2016) (Fox News anchor claimed right of publicity violation in Hasbro “Hamster 
Toy” for using her full name and alleged “likeness”); Lindsay Lohan Loses Case Against 
Makers of Grand Theft Auto, FORTUNE (Sept. 1, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/01/lindsay 
-lohan-grand-theft-auto/ (dismissing Lindsay Lohan’s case against a video game for creating 
a character with a similar look, voice, clothing, and hair, claiming it was a work of fiction that 
did not appropriate her likeness, but, instead, portrayed the likeness of the fictional character). 
 148  Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001) 
(formulating a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based 
on whether the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed 
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation). 
 149  Rogers, 875 F.2d 994, 997 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
 152  ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Hurley v. 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) 
(holding that the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of 
expression)).  
 153  White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting). 
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ask where society would be “if Charles Lindbergh had an exclusive right 
in the concept of a heroic solo aviator?  If Arthur Conan Doyle had gotten 
a copyright in the idea of the detective story, or Albert Einstein had 
patented the theory of relativity?”154  Judge Kozinski feared that “[i]f 
every author and celebrity had been given the right to keep people from 
mocking them or their work” they would “have made the world poorer, 
not richer, culturally as well as economically.”155 
Should every famous person have an exclusive right to anything that 
reminds a viewer of her?  This is risky as it may deny any future Vanna 
Whites an opportunity to create a persona because brands that may seek 
to hire an actress for an advertising campaign may now claim that this 
individual’s look is too similar to one that already exists—Judge Kozinski 
writes that this is dangerous and creates a deprivation of parody and 
mockery.156  But at the same time, should future creators be able to 
commercialize upon the creations that have come before?  While this 
would not restrict their freedom of speech under the First Amendment, it 
would severely impact the individual’s ability to commercially take 
advantage of the dually economic and moral right of publicity through 
the process of deciding how his or her own persona, including life story 
and character portrayal is utilized. 
There is something unsettling about giving someone too much 
power over his or her life story or past roles.157  But why are courts and 
legislatures apt to quickly provide trademark protection for someone who 
invented a product or copyright protection over the creation of a work 
involving “sweat of the brow,” but not comparable publicity rights to 
someone who invested time cultivating his or her talent and career?158  
This imbalance of justice furthers the argument for why there should be 
statutory safeguards for publicity rights, albeit narrowly defined. 
But there exists an idyllic resolution to best balance the competing 
equities between ownership of one’s self and prevention of silencing free 
speech.  Legislatures must allow for the addition of life story and fictional 
character rights under the right of publicity umbrella, but create stringent 
parameters and an exacting evidentiary requirement, thus ensuring that 
this legislation does not place a chilling effect over freedom of speech or 
 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. 
 156  Id. at 1516-17. 
 157  Jim Rutenberg, Spike Lee Is Expected To Settle Suit Over Spike TV, N.Y. TIMES (July 
8, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/08/business/spike-lee-is-expected-to-settle-suit-
over-spike-tv.html?_r=0 (stating Spike Lee brought suit against Viacom to enjoin the network 
from naming one of its networks “Spike” TV). 
 158  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co, 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991). 
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expression or restrict matters of “public importance.”159  By demanding 
that the persona be appropriated and not merely the circumstances or 
situation, the limitations placed upon the right will still serve to ensure 
that individuals are not granted too many rights that would prevent the 
creation of new works.  Legislatures should demand a heightened burden 
of proof that an author must meet in order to create a work. This ensures 
that works inspired by events or people are perfectly permissible, but 
once they cross the line to usurp another’s life or make use of a character 
that an actor has portrayed and made famous, the use is not done without 
compensation or contractual permission.  Additionally, for either life 
story rights or fictional character persona rights, these works can still be 
created with express permission, thereby not restricting them from ever 
again entering the marketplace.  First Amendment freedoms will still 
exist, and these constitutionally protected rights will guarantee an artist’s 
ability to continue generating and producing creative works that are 
inspired by real-life circumstances and based on events that are of public 
interest and concern. 
IV. EXPANDING THE POST-MORTEM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY THROUGH THE 
CREATION OF A DESCENDIBLE FUTURE INTEREST 
The right of publicity should be descendible through the creation of 
a future interest for rights-holders to control their rights of publicity post-
mortem by granting an heir the ability to continue to profit, or on the 
opposite end, restricting others from unduly profiting, even after the 
persona in question has died.160  As the law currently stands, of the 
varying right of publicity statutes that are in place in each state that does 
not solely adhere to the common law, each one takes a different stance 
on whether or not the right of publicity should extend after death.161  The 
creation of a uniform publicity right that is fully descendible, devisable, 
and alienable would greatly assist estate planners working with 
celebrities.162  As the right presently stands, it is both devisable and 
 
 159  See Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., 812 F.3d 824, 830-31 
(11th Cir. 2016); see also Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change v. Am. Heritage Prods., 
694 F.2d 674, 677 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 160  See Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 992 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (holding New York does not recognize post-mortem publicity rights, thereby 
allowing Monroe’s persona to enter the public domain). 
 161  See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2017, chapters 
1 to 331) (stating New York does not recognize the descendible right of publicity; it is non-
assignable and terminates at death); but see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Westlaw current 
through Ch. 685 of 2017 Reg. Sess.) (stating California holds liable any person who uses a 
deceased person’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness). 
 162  T.J. Hope, The Right of Publicity: An Often Overlooked Asset in Estate Planning, 
STOUT (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.srr.com/article/right-publicity-often-overlooked-asset-esta 
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alienable but not uniformly descendible.163  So, a publicity rights-holder 
could sell the right of publicity of his or her name or likeness to another, 
while maintaining control over its usage.164  In the estate-planning 
context, the right of publicity should be viewed as a business value in the 
decedent’s “gross estate.”165  The Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) defines 
the gross estate as encompassing one’s “value at the time of his death of 
all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible.”166  It seems 
counterintuitive to permit a rights-holder to sell or transfer his rights to 
another for use during his lifetime but not for use after his death.  In 
determining the value of federal estate taxes upon death, the right of 
publicity has been included in the calculation based on certain factors 
such as contractual value while the decedent was alive.167 
One of the most famous cases involving the debate over the post-
mortem right of publicity involved a company that was granted an 
exclusive license to use Elvis Presley’s name and likeness for commercial 
purposes after his death, and sought an injunction against another 
company that began selling Presley posters.168  The court explained that 
if the publicity right was developed through commercial investment and 
exploitation during the holder’s lifetime, then it should be devisable or 
descendible at death, like any other intangible property right.169  Public 
policy also supports this view: by allowing an individual to “pass the 
fruits of his labors” along to others after his death, this provides an 
incentive for both enterprise and capital development and contribution to 
the public benefit and enjoyment during life.170  In a previous case 
involving Presley’s estate, the Sixth Circuit felt that “leaving a good name 
to one’s children is sufficient reward in itself for the individual, whether 
famous or not.”171  But in this case, the court disagreed: Judge Newman 
explained that claiming “good name” as an adequate familial legacy 
shortchanges individuals who have invested their time and effort in 
 
te-planning. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Id. (“The right of publicity relates to the business value of the very identity or persona 
of an individual as a human being, and the commercial damage that may ensue if that identity 
is used in an unauthorized manner in ways that bring harm to the image and reputation of the 
individual.”). 
 166  26 U.S.C. § 2031 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-55). 
 167  Estate of Andrews v. U.S., 850 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (E.D. Va. 1994) (explaining that 
the value of the decedent’s name at the time of her death for use on ghostwritten books was 
based on its fair market value, using her publishing contract as evidence). 
 168  Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 279 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 169  Id. at 287. 
 170  Id. 
 171  Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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developing the worth of that name, rather than, for example, in the stock 
market, and feared that this would place too heavy a burden on 
creativity.172 
A Second Circuit case, Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co.,173 
dealt with the question of the descendible nature of the right of publicity 
for the heirs of the Marx Brothers in preventing the production of a play 
featuring the Brothers’ likeness and comedic style.  While a New York 
district court found that the play infringed upon the Brothers’ right of 
publicity, the Second Circuit reversed.174  Since the Marx Brothers were 
domiciled in California at the times of their deaths and also drew out 
contracts regarding the status of their rights of publicity as governed 
under California law, California choice-of-law applied in determining the 
post-mortem right.175  This inconsistency makes estate-planning more 
difficult and forces those who utilize their right of publicity during their 
lifetime to be more precise in transferring or selling that right to others in 
terms of determining what state’s law shall apply in future litigation. 
The Elvis Presley cases also attempted to put to rest the issue of 
whether the future interest should be put into place regardless of whether 
or not the owner “exploited” the right during his or her life.176  Previous 
cases held that a publicity rights-holder had to have taken advantage of 
the commercialization of her publicity while she was alive in order to 
allow for her heirs to do so upon her passing.177  But this undue burden 
makes as much sense as a requirement that a former child actor cannot 
economize from his right of publicity at age fifty if he has not during the 
previous forty-eight years.  If an individual’s persona is of such a value 
that others would appropriate it for its intrinsic value, then that persona 
should be protected and held in trust by the individual’s selected heirs. 
Allowing the right of publicity to continue after death benefits both 
the celebrity’s heirs as well as the celebrity’s fans who would like to be 
continually reminded of the celebrity’s life story or famous characters 
into perpetuity.178 
 
 172  Factors Etc., Inc., 652 F.2d at 287. 
 173  Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 318 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 174  Id. at 318-19 (holding, in the district court, that the play was neither biographical nor 
an attempt to convey information, and that there was a wholesale appropriation of the Marx 
Brothers characters.). 
 175  Id. at 320 (citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 
1979); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979)). 
 176  Factors Etc., Inc., 579 F.2d at 222 n.11. 
 177  Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431. 
 178  William A. Drennan, Wills, Trusts, Schadenfreude, and the Wild, Wacky Right of 
Publicity: Exploring the Enforceability of Dead-Hand Restrictions, 58 ARK. L. REV. 43, 96 
(2005) (arguing that the ability to create images featuring deceased celebrities should hinge 
upon the rights of the fans who enriched the celebrity and want to be reminded of her image 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The right of publicity is a legal framework that has existed since the 
middle of the twentieth century.179  It has arisen in the context of unfair 
trade practices, false endorsements, and general unauthorized 
misappropriation.180  Amending right of publicity legislation to address 
the contexts of life story rights and fictional character portrayal rights will 
benefit not only the rights-holders themselves but also the general public 
that enjoys these forms of entertainment.  The looming fear of prior 
restraints or future litigation may prevent artists from even venturing to 
create these works in the first place. 
Therefore, it is vital that the legislation carve out heightened 
required showings of proof regarding the similarities between the work 
in question and the real-life persona.  Factors set forth in the legislation, 
such as the results from surveys showing viewers the docudrama and 
detailing the alleged misappropriated life, a list of physical and 
circumstantial connections between the fictionalized character and the 
actual human, and the existence of a preexisting relationship between the 
artist and the persona, would force artists to take these elements into 
consideration prior to putting a work into the entertainment marketplace.  
Doing so would provide additional shields against the restrictions being 
too chilling or violative of First Amendment rights to freedom of speech 
and expression.  Those exceptions would also protect merely coincidental 
occurrences.  Additionally, “transformative” uses as defined under the 
Copyright Clause, such as parody or satire, would be exempt from the 
restricted uses.181  A “public importance” exception would ensure public 
issues are not contested as appropriative, while only personal personas 
are disputed as used in an unauthorized manner.182 
Broadening this legislation would also create a bright-line, 
legislatively-mandated rule that would close the door to litigious claims 
and ease the burden on courts, especially those in jurisdictions that are 
more inclined to receive right of publicity cases.183  Additionally, as a 
result of the differentiation that exists between different jurisdictions in 
 
and work and the heirs of the estate who have a financial interest in reasonably managing the 
commercial use of the decedent’s identity). 
 179  See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 180  See generally Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 2016) (misappropriation); 
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (endorsement); 
Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 430 (trade practice). 
 181  17 U.S.C. § 107 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-55). 
 182  SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 183  Toby J. Stern, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 377, 377 (2003) (“For nearly two hundred years, judges in the United States have 
expressed a desire to avoid opening the ‘floodgates litigation’ upon the court system.”). 
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their approaches to the right of publicity, a uniform statutory right would 
act as a safeguard against forum shopping.184 
Most essentially, modifying this legislation would not silence future 
creators, but would instead enhance their ability to freely create by 
requiring that life story bundled rights are purchased through contractual 
agreements or that the individuals who inspired these stories are granted 
a royalty from the resulting work’s profits.185  In the context of actors’ 
ownership of the fictional characters that they portray, when these images 
are used for commercial purposes, granting the actor a proprietary right 
would also give advertisers more creative freedom in their campaigns.  In 
successfully allowing life and art to merge, both artists and publicity-
worthy personas can benefit from the ubiquitous generation of creative 
and artistic works that are protected by the dual-pronged economic and 
moral right of publicity, thereby ensuring that they are not violative of 
the First Amendment. 
 
 
 184  Forum Shopping, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER L. DICTIONARY DESK EDITION 
(2012) (“Selection among several jurisdictions of the most favorable to a party.  Forum 
shopping is the practice by both plaintiffs and defendants of seeking to bring a claim or 
transfer an action to the forum the litigant believes is the most likely to favor its own argument.  
Such favoritism might be perceived because of objective differences in the law of the forum, 
such as a longer or shorter period of limitations or more or less favorable rules governing the 
plaintiff’s standing.  It might also arise from the attorneys’ perception of hostility or favoritism 
toward a type of claim or party by the bench or the jury pool in a given forum.”). 
 185  Lisa A. Callif, To Acquire or Not To Acquire Life Rights For A Movie, LAW 360 (June 
22, 2015, 10:28 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/665781/to-acquire-or-not-to-acquire-
life-rights-for-a-movie (“Historically, movies based on true stories were not made unless the 
rights to the individuals involved in the story were acquired.”). 
